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Abstract: This article addresses the social and historical relation between Chicago School neo-liberalism
and contemporary racism, and its connections with the formations of racism in classical liberalism and
its colonial character. I show the pragmatic and discursive operations of neo-racism in the context
of this shift to a neo-liberal discourse, drawing particularly on Michel Foucault’s seminars, Society
Must be Defended, and Birth of Bio-politics. Insofar as “race” cannot be understood as a discrete
category outside its social, economic, moral, and political embeddedness in liberalism, I argue that
methodological individualism and expectations of high-specialization constrain the theorization of
race in U.S. scholarship. Racial lines will continue to be (re)excavated, borrowed, or inscribed afresh
to channel, reinforce, and institutionalize the social violence that neo-liberalism must unleash.
Keywords: neoliberalism; race; Foucault; liberalism; internal racism

This article analyzes the social and historical relationship between Chicago school neo-liberalism
and contemporary racism, or what some have called neo-racism (Balibar 1991; Bonilla-Silva 1997;
Goldberg 1993, 2011), in light of the formation of racism in the colonial origins of classical liberalism.
I will be discussing racialization through the thought/works of Michel Foucault, who locates race
in the historical formations of liberal ideology and governmental practice. I will then move on to
pursue the ramifications of the constitutive raciality of liberalism into post world war II neo-liberalism.
My emphasis is on the seeming coincidence that an extreme discourse such as American neo-liberalism
should originate in a country where a racial schism runs deep in the social consciousness. I am arguing
that the historically entrenched sociological condition of race, and its punitive ferocity, make possible
the extreme metaphysics of American neo-liberalism. The latter, in turn, engineers a form of racism
that operates effortlessly, if viciously, under the cover of a post-racial epoch.
1. The Concept of Race
In recent years, there has been some pioneering critical work on the production and formations of
race in neo-liberal practices. This scholarship demonstrates that race incorporates into, and legitimizes
the exclusionary structure of contemporary societies that maintain high tech late modern lifestyles in
communities forted up against all kinds of insecurities, while barricaded against a growing underclass
abandoned and left at complete risk (see Young 1999; Goldberg 2011; Dupuis and Thorns 2008;
Hadis 2014; Giroux 2012). Racial marking helps to legitimize systematic exclusion, and to violently
suppress this underclass in a putative pursuit of law and order. At the same time, scholars have
amply demonstrated that this affinity with racism is not novel to neo-liberalism, but has indeed been
constitutive of the liberal discourse, since its early moments in Hobbes and Locke, and in the heights
of the Enlightenment philosophy of Hume, Kant, and Voltaire (Eze 1997; Bernasconi and Mann 2005;
Goldberg 1993).
Critical literature on the racial underpinnings of liberalism is, however, far removed from
“mainstream” sociological conceptions of race relations that habitually see racism as a problem
of prejudice that is being gradually overcome through education and historical progress (see
Feagin 2006; Miles 1993; Goldberg 1993). This discourse is understandably confronted by a social
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reality where one account after the other shows that racism today operates through denial, is couched
effectively if ironically in the language of civil rights, and covertly produces color-based discrimination
precisely by advocating a colorblind framework and a language of non-discrimination (Gallagher 2003;
Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva 2008; Gilroy 2000; Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi 2001; Alexander 2012).
Paradoxically enough, using race to make a case for social discrimination and inequality only attracts
charges of reverse racism, even a “McCarthyism of the left” (D’Souza 1991, p. 195); and popular
support against race-based discrimination it seems can only be won by eschewing any mention of race
(Delgado 2012). Contrariwise, a heavily racialized imagery motivates conservative policy initiatives
even as it is extensively coded by legal experts in a language of equality and fairness. Be it for the
conservative racist or the anti-discrimination activist, “race” cannot be mentioned—at least not publicly.
As some analysts observe, it is an “elephant in the mind” (Carbado and Harris 2008). Furthermore,
progressive ethnographers otherwise sympathetic to the cause of the racially oppressed seem to find
themselves in moral and discursive binds, where they risk reinforcing the same oppressive social logic
whose consequences they apparently challenge (Wacquant 2002).
At a loss to explain these paradoxes, contemporary theorists of race in the United States
(US) are a rather divided and disorderly house. On one hand, there is a case for the declining
significance of race (Wilson 1978)1 . Notwithstanding the shades in Wilson’s argument, it is belied
by outrageous differences by race in incarceration rates, wealth and income standards, exposure to
environmental hazards, police shootings, and all kinds of racial profiling (see for example, Alexander
2012; Bullard 2000; Wacquant 2001; Feagin 2006). On the other hand, there is a case of systemic
racism and an assertion of race as a structural determinant of US society (see Omi and Winant 1994;
Alexander 2012; Goldberg 2011; Bonilla-Silva 1997; Feagin 2006; Giroux 2012). Thus, Omi and Winant
(1994) in their “racial formation” theory argued that race was a primary principle of social organization
in the United States. They saw racism being deployed for a war of position, as opposed to the overt
conflicts that characterized the earlier period. Although a breakthrough in American sociology, this
approach could not but resign into an idealism, which rests the onus on policy choices and whims of
the US political leadership (see also Carbado and Harris 2008)2 . Feagin makes an even more forceful
argment of systemic racism, where whites’ historical and continuing power, wealth, and status in
American society directly corresponds with the crushing of colored people. “Mainstream” sociological
approaches, Feagin argues, miss “the reality of this whole society being founded on, and firmly
grounded in, oppression targeting African Americans (and other Americans of color) now for several
centuries” (p. 7). Bonilla-Silva’s argument of colorblind racism—a form of racism that operates
covertly, and in denial—likewise demonstrates the subterfuges and feints through which racism and
discrimination continue to thrive notwithstanding civil rights legislation.
The importance of the historical dimension, demonstrated by these scholars, in the material,
legal, and ideological infrastructure that continues to shape the perceptions as much as the reality
of race in the United States cannot be over-emphasized (see also Alexander 2012; Wacquant 2000).
However, albeit critical by intention, this scholarship frequently assumes “race” as an attribute of the
body, which disguises the fact that “race” is in its very foundations an epistemological category of
colonial and capitalist domination. As Miles argues, they “implicitly (and often explicitly) endorse
common sense . . . and hence sustain an ideology which Barzun called a ‘Modern Superstition’ . . .
and which Montagu described as ‘Man’s Most Dangerous Myth’” (Miles 1993, p. 47). “Any analytical
use of the idea of ‘race,’ disguises the fact” that the idea of “race” is “essentially ideological” (p. 45).

1

2

Wilson’s argument is relativistic since he argues the growing significance of “class” as opposed to ‘race’. However, he fails
to provides us a theory to analytically differentiate the two ‘categories’ or indeed to show how they converge. Thus, his
argument for the “declining significance of race” has to be taken at face value.
Paul Gilroy’s (Gilroy 2000) account also has an idealist bend, which puts too much emphasis on cognitive transcendence of
color-based racial lines.
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The problem is similar to the flaws in the common distinction between gender and sex in feminist
scholarship. As Butler (2002) importantly argues,
“gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means
by which “sexed nature” or “a natural sex” is produced and established as “prediscursive,”
prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts” (p. 11).
Likewise, if race is a product of capitalist and colonial domination, having actually little to do with
skin tones and body types per se, then racialization as a critical concept must persistently disengage
from ever-changing popular and statist racial categories. Perennial vigilance against these habits of
thought, folk-concepts that make deductive truth out of the particularities of a hegemonic American
society and academia, is an uphill but essential task (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999).
Toward these ends, in this analysis I will draw extensively from two of Michel Foucault’s lectures
at the College de France: (a) the elaboration of the history of race in his 1975–1976 lectures, Society
Must be Defended (Foucault 2003); and (b) his 1979 lectures on neo-liberal governmentality, Birth of
Biopolitics (Foucault 2008a). The advantage of discussing race with Foucault is his near aloofness to the
epistemological temptation of categories of physical appearance. One only has to see cases such as
the Jews in Europe, the Burakumin in Japan, or caste in India, among so many other instances, that
physical features are more or less invented, arbitrary, and changing signifiers of distinction produced
by in-group interests and biases (Deliege 1992; Wagatsuma 1972; Gilman 2000).
By staying away from racial physiology, Foucault is able to locate racialization as an attribute
of the practices of government and capital accumulation, a continuum across the boundaries of the
nation. Foucault’s argument is in some respects comparable to Cox (1948), Miles (1993), Balibar (1991),
and Goldberg (1993) emphasis on the significance of race in the ideological and material operations of
colonial exploitation. However, his observations extend beyond the colonization and exploitation of
labor, to include the pragmatics of social control and demonstrate racialization also on the hither side
of the ethnic or national community. This, as we will see, is singularly important in the operations of
race in the exclusion, criminalization, and stigmatization of a growing global underclass, and the mass
deception that presents the structural violence of global poverty as a moral and cultural depravity of
the disenfranchised (Steinberg 2001; Young 1999; Goldberg 2011; Giroux 2012).
2. The Two Shades, Two Areas of Racism
In his famous 1789 pamphlet on the third estate, says Foucault, the Abbé Emmanuel Joseph
Sieyes reasoned: “What is the third estate? Everything. What has it been heretofore in the political
order? Nothing. What does it demand? To become something herein” (Foucault 2003, p. 217).
In the emergence of this discourse—a multiplicity of speech acts that pull together to organize
perception—Foucault locates the birth of the modern nation and, as we shall see, of “race.” The nation,
an entity that heretofore did not exist outside the figure of the sovereign, is here recognized in the
body of the third estate, the people, their enterprise and industriousness. This is the moment where
the third estate comes to recognize that it bears, in itself, all the functions and apparatuses required
to constitute, to be the nation. And so, the nation heretofore arrested in the figure of the king and
defined in reference to external forces in wars, treaties, and so forth becomes self-referential and is
redirected into its own body. It becomes a positive project to be achieved in the constitution of its body
as a robust state, in its “ability to administer itself, to manage, govern, and guarantee the constitutions
and workings of the state and of state power” (Foucault 2003, p. 223).
Two sets of tactics come to be deployed for the administration of the population in the emergence
of the modern state: disciplinization at the level of the micro-physics of the body, and statistical
regulation at the level of the population or the society. The two tactics act in unison, and often in
mutually reinforcing ways to make the government of the modern state. The administrative change in
society is concomitant with a change in its goals. The pre-modern notion of national sovereignty, argues
Foucault, was auto-referential: the end of sovereignty was the exercise of sovereignty, the touchstone
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of the common good were the laws themselves. In governmentality, however, laws are tactically
driven towards ends that are outside them. Citing Guillaume de la Perriere—”government is the right
disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end” (p. 208)—Foucault (2003) argues,
. . . convenient for each of the things that are to be governed. This implies a plurality
of specific aims: for instance, government will have to ensure that the greatest possible
quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of
subsistence, that the population is enabled to multiply, and so on (p. 210).
The modern state is thus constituted in reference to an abstract idea of surplus maximization,
or quantitative achievement in terms of standardized and convenient conceptions of “the thing”
(and human relation to “things”).
In this analysis, the evolution of the modern state as the good, powerful, legitimate national body
is predicated on the deployment of bio-power as a rationality of a detailed and exhaustive classification
of people. The cultivation and promotion of the good social body requires a continuous engagement
of the body with itself, distinguishing its good, superior parts from the diseased and inferior. Such
classification is the condition for the formation and exercise of bio-power. Here, in the process of social
fragmentation as a prerequisite of governmentality, Foucault locates racialization: “The first function of
racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by bio-power” (p. 255).
So far so good. But why does this project of differentiation become so important at this particular
time? What political, economic, and moral circumstances make it necessary and possible? What
discourse unifies these different aspects? Let us continue with the last question. There are multiple
responsibilities or operations expected of this discourse. First, it has to promote an economic rationality
of wealth generation and accumulation, which spectacularly characterizes the times. Second, it has to
carry the moral valence of the ideas of equality and justice, while producing new differences. That
is, it has to host a democratic rhetoric, which eschews the principle of natural difference within the
nation, such as that of “blue blood,” and build space for a new structure of social differences. Thirdly,
it has to manage the encounter with the colonies, build legitimacy while exploiting and extracting
surplus. This discourse is liberalism—simultaneously a political, economic, and moral discourse
(see Foucault 2003; see also Burchell 1991; Dean 2001; Lemke 2001). It is the privileged form in which
the “modern” presents and represents itself.
This social order motivates the body of the nation through imperatives of material and cultural
progress, simultaneously advocating a pragmatic social stratification. The previously “natural” and
hereditary differences in social ranking here give way to a logic of differences apparently justified
in a social space defined by “freedom.” As in any other era, of course, the distinction by wealth or
“earnings,” so to speak, first inscribes itself as an aesthetic differentiation, marked in social space
through geographical, moral, and cultural insignia.
However, unlike previous states, the liberal nation continuously presents itself as a work in
progress, charged with bringing freedom and wealth to every one of its citizens in due time. Thereby, it
presents itself with an obligation to continuously improve on the people, measure achievements,
classify and add value to people and things alike. This pertains to governmentality, involving
the twin practices of disciplinization, and social stratification, including the production of the
mad, the dangerous, the unproductive, the lazy, the weak, and so on, as unworthy social groups
(see Foucault 2003; Burchell 1991, 1993; Dean 2001; Gordon 1991). This is racialization on the hither
side of the nation.
Such racialization, however, is intimately tied to the production of the other “race(s)” on the far
shore. The discourse of “race” is born from the contradictions of the colonial dimension of liberalism.
Without “race,” this discourse could never negotiate an inevitable dichotomy of dispositions—that
is, to putatively shift from an apparently benevolent figure invested in the material and moral
development of its citizens into a colonial agent of murder, war, and subjugation for the outside.
As Foucault (2003) says, how could bio-power, which characterized the modern logic of state practice,
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exert the conventional sovereign authority to wage war, kill, and suppress, unless for a discourse of
racial difference (p. 257)? The other had to be marked by racial difference.
The other race was marked by lack. Evident in a lack of military prowess, economic development,
and moral and physiological qualities, such lack was simultaneously a cultural product and an essential
deficiency in the people. The evident lack could not but be empirically traced to dispositions emanating
from culture and habit (biologically rooted or not)—lack of working culture, sexual promiscuity, moral
incontinence, uncontrolled breeding, indiscipline and bad faith. This self was entitled to political
rights and freedom as opposed to the irrational, child-like other, who could not be trusted with moral
behavior and hence was deserving of enslavement and colonization. Thus, John Locke’s passionate
defense of the English man’s “inalienable rights,” vis-à-vis the monarch is systematically based on
the demonstration of his adulthood, his rational ability to territorialize nature as private property.
Native Americans, Africans, or Asians mark the lack, the negative referent of this positive essence of
the Englishman as a rational adult (see Bernasconi and Mann 2005; Higginbotham 1978; Locke 1982)3 .
Hobbes’ nonchalant defense of slavery and Locke’s recognition of the adult, rational human
only in the appropriation of private property demonstrate the production of “race” in the formative
moments of political liberalism, but this exigency continues to the height of the Enlightenment
philosophy of Voltaire, Hume, and Kant. The brazen, self-evident inferiority of the other is the
condition of liberalism’s epistemological certainty. Hume concludes: “There never was a civilized
nation of any other complexion than white . . . No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts,
no sciences . . . NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of which none ever discovered any
symptoms of ingenuity” (Hume 1768, p. 235n). Kant emphatically concurs and adds: “The Negroes of
Africa have by nature no feeling, which rises above the trifling” (Kant 2003, p. 110). Kant’s interest in
the relations between geography and anthropology as studies into man’s external and internal nature
is by no means peripheral to the structure of his thought (see Eze 1997). As Foucault avers in his
study of Kant’s Anthropology (a subject Kant continued to teach till his retirement), these empirical
observations seem “secretly indispensable to the structure of Kantian thought; something like the seed
of pure reason, the deep-rooted origin of its transcendental illusions” (Foucault 2008b, p. 65).
The racialized and colonial social space provides an ideal setting and occasion for liberalism to
express its different sides. On one hand, racial insignia represents a radical separation of geographical
and social space, which allows full-blooded expression of the sovereign right to kill, plunder,
and exploit for the nation’s commercial and political interests. National capital thus has a colony,
over whose raw materials, labor, and market, it has absolute control. At the same time, it is an ideal
site for the expression of governmentalization. Here the modern state can express its imperatives
and mechanism of discipline, stratification, and control, with urgency, and with a heavy hand. Thus,
the colonized territory or subject was the privileged marker of the racial other, in which contradictory
dispositions of liberalism could simultaneously express, elucidate, and negotiate between themselves.
Domination over the other also provides a reason, an agenda, enables a social project for domination
within the nation. The marking of the “other” race, at the same time, fuels the project for the regulation
and improvement of “this” race, whose wretched represent the potential historical and civilizational
perils of all that is despicable in the “other” (see also Dean 2001; Burchell 1991; Procacci 1991). The two
fields of domination constitute grounds for each other.
Indeed, the more forthrightness and moral urgency that the colonial power demonstrated in its
mission of governmentalization, the more leverage it could gain for its sovereign authority. As the
many debates and political movements of the 19th century indicate, and the unfolding of world history
in the 20th century would suggest, the political expediency of colonial domination within the frame of
a liberal discourse was never a smooth task (Foucault 2003). In any case, modern racism reached a
climactic turn in the early 20th century, particularly in the extreme racism of Nazi Germany within

3

See paragraphs 37, 43, 49, 86, and 180 of Locke’s second Thesis on Government.
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Europe. The apparent absence of superficial physiological distinctions by no means prevented racism
from seeing in the Jew a condensed embodiment of evil—their internal, moral state, and scheming
nature, but reflected in their “disgusting skin diseases,” “muzzle-shaped mouth and face,” or indeed
their hawkish nose (Gilman 2000, p. 232).
The events of the Second World War, historic political assertions of the anti-colonial movements
across the globe, the civil rights movement in the US, and many other assertions of social equality in
the workers’ movements, the feminist movements, and socialist projects ensured that the old racial
rhetoric simply became inefficacious. The liberal operationalization of race as simultaneously a deep
difference that would allow for absolute mastery and exploitation, and the smug charitable mission of
civilizing the other as a hapless victim of habits and misfortune which gives it moral authority is now
redundant (Foucault 2003). So, how does racism now operate in a time when race has apparently been
transcended, or nearly so, in state policy as well as in everyday social relations?
In general, race now retracts from its external orientation, and is increasingly internally directed.
The wretched other is, in fact, the geographically co-present racial other. So we must cast another look
at the internal operations of racism. That is: to create distinctions within the social body, measure
the population in its varied characteristics, stratify it, separate the superior, the rational, and useful,
from the socially incompetent and dangerous. The reasoning and ends are simultaneously aesthetic
and metaphysical. The project is to promote a normative aesthetics and disposition that is oriented
to economically rational behavior, and the convenient consumption of its rewards. This disposition
is meant to be constructed through disciplinary technologies. Those that fail must be removed from
the public gaze, either by confinement as in the United States or simply thrown out of the sight
of the “tourists” and “honest citizens,” as is the case in Delhi, for example. Thus, in a series of
proceedings for aggressive demolition of slums and the eviction of millions from Delhi, to make
it more like London, Delhi’s high court ruled: “The right of honest citizens [who ‘pay handsome
price for acquiring land’] . . . cannot be made subservient to the rights of encroachers [‘unscrupulous
elements’]” (Ghertner 2012, pp. 1168–78). “Everyday depictions of slums as dirty, uncivil, out of place”
thus become statutory (p. 1162). This is a global process, as Goldberg (2011) argues:
Those thus seen as threatening to disrupt these authorized economic, informational,
and cultural flows, movements, placements, and positionings—the media of value and
significance, of capital, after all—become more or less racially marked, racial rogues, mutant
states . . . A state of exception licenses the state . . . to treat such subjects in any way deemed
necessary to restrict, restrain, or disappear them (p. 348).
True to the expansionary phase of capitalism it represented, classical liberalism has at the outset a
paradoxical relationship with this other. On one hand, it finds this externality disturbing; on the
other, it is precisely the source of its knowledge. The pauper, for example, disturbs the self-contained
comfort of the modern order in difference; or, as the case of Malthus’s Irish peasant shows, by his
indifference to this order (Procacci 1991). He is at once an internal entity in continuous reference to
whose assimilation as the future consumer this potential economy creates the content of its practical
knowledge or savoir (Procacci 1991), and an external, inscrutable disturbance. A similarly tense
relationship can be observed in early modern conceptions of the prisoner that shift between the homo
penalis, who despite the differences in character and inclinations is redeemable and is a factor of
social solidarity, and the homo criminalis, who belongs to a different race and has to be neutralized
(Pasquino 1991; see also Garland 1997). The new racism, however, will produce as its social condition,
neo-liberalism. No longer interested in disciplining or redeeming (after all labor is vastly surplus, is a
nuisance, and needs to be disposed of, and this wretched has little in purchasing power), it beckons no
ambivalences, and will seamlessly merge the two categories of the criminal and the pauper—deficiency
in conforming to the reason of the economy or a lack of human capital. To understand neo-racism, we
must understand neo-liberalism.
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3. Neo-Liberalism in Chicago
In his 1979–1980 lectures, Foucault presented a most thorough and clear social and historical
analysis of neo-liberalism. He plants the thread back in the dilemmas of German thinkers after the
Second World War, ruminating on the Nazi disaster, the reasons for it and the path forward. On one
side was the Frankfurt School, finding their way through Freud, Marx, and Weber, and locating
Nazism to the innate irrationality of laissez faire. Foucault, however, focuses on the thoughts of
another group, the Ordo-liberals. Their argument was the opposite. The Ordo-liberals reasoned that
Nazism was rather a result of not enough market, a fallout of state controls over the market in the
name of welfare, nationalism, and so forth. Deviating from the apparently “naïve naturalism” of
classical liberalism, which focused on “exchange” and sees the market as a natural, self-sustaining
institution, the Ordo-liberals identified formal “competition” as the essential component of a theory of
the market. Furthermore,
The beneficial effects of competition are not due to a pre-existing nature, to a natural
given that it brings with it. They are due to a formal privilege. Competition is an essence.
Competition is an eidos. Competition is a principle of formalization . . . a formal game
between inequalities; it is not a natural game between individuals and behaviors (p. 120).
The conditions of competition therefore, they argued, have to be artificially constructed and carefully
regulated through governance. As in Husserl’s eidos, where the intuition of a formal structure appears
only under certain conditions, the logic of competition would only produce the desired effects under
specific conditions (Husserl 2012; Foucault 2008a). The problem of monopoly, which classical liberalism
conceived as a limitation of the logic of capitalism, was for the Ordo-liberals an archaic concern.
Monopoly was a consequence of bureaucratic interventions of a predatory neo-feudalist nature.
In this formulation, any strict separation of the market and the “legal-political superstructure” is
untenable. The origins of capitalism are explained not as a logical consequence of transformations in
the economic sphere but in a specific politico-economic complex that was obtained in 18th century
Europe. As for the future, the Ordo-liberals emphasized capitalism’s open future, seeing capitalism as
an institution whose success or failures would be decided by how the political structure facilitated
or intervened in the blockages that it was bound to face periodically. The primary function of social
policy, they argued, was not of a negative type, that is, to offset the undesirable consequences of
the market, but the positive task of blocking anti-competitive reactions that the society may spawn.
In the Ordo-liberal frame, social policy is expected to provide the material basis for the enterprise as
the privileged form of the social; momentous organizational state intervention, they reckoned, was
required to place entrepreneurial rationality in the pulse of the society. The point was to shift “the
center of gravity of governmental action downwards” (Foucault 2008a, p. 148).
Despite their unequivocal emphasis on the market, the Ordo-liberal proposition had a strong
counter element. Their conception of the generalization of the enterprise form, involves a
Gesellschaftpolitik, which juxtaposes the reconstruction of a set of “warm” moral and cultural values
antithetical to the “cold” mechanism of competition.
It is a matter of reconstructing concrete points of anchorage around the individual which
form what Rustow called the Vitalpolitik. The return to the enterprise is therefore at once an
economic policy or a policy of the economization of the entire social field, of the extension
of the economy to the entire social field, but at the same time a policy, which presents
itself or seeks to be a kind of Vitalpolitik with the function of compensating for what is
cold, impassive, calculating, and mechanical in the strictly economic game of competition.
(Foucault 2008a, p. 243)
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The Chicago School thought that increasingly engineers social and economic policies today shares many
ideas with the Ordo-liberals, but with a distinctly American twist.4 For one, it surely jettisoned any
scope for social and moral countercurrents. Instead of positing the state as a facilitator of the market,
the Chicago School economists saw the market itself as the foundation, the regulating mechanism for
the state and proposed that social relations were in themselves an economic domain. Unlike classical
liberalism, which abstracts labor as a factor of production recompensed through wages, the Chicago
economists considered the human in totality as herself a form of capital, and wage as the income
earned by this capital. “Human capital” is a product of investments in terms of education, upbringing,
or genetic ability (Foucault 2008a, pp. 225–30; Becker 1974, 1993). Moreover, the productive activity of
this human capital is not limited to labor as it is conventionally designated, but extends to its exercise
of consumption where it produces its own satisfaction. “In this perspective, the consumer is not only a
being who consumes; he is an economic agent who ‘produces.’ Who produces what? Who produces
satisfactions of which he is the consumer” (H. Lepage cited in Foucault 2008a, p. 236).
Furthermore, the market logic is extended beyond the areas of social activity delimited as
“economic.” The market logic of supply and demand, of investments, cost, and profit—financial
or psychological—is extended to all kinds of non-economic activities, including the family, criminal
law, and the state. The economic logic provides a universal grid of intelligibility for any kind of
social practice, from the family, to crime, to the state. The government is itself understood as an
enterprise of sorts with the function of ensuring that social institutions comply with the market’s
reason. The economic logic can thus function to test any government policy, assess its validity, and take
it to task if required, on a publicly shared grid of intelligibility, for waste, welfare, lack of efficiency,
and so on (Foucault 2008a).
In the neo-liberal discourse of the Chicago School, the classical liberal dichotomy between
the market as the zone of free economic pursuit and the rights of the individual as a sovereign
entity looks finally resolved. In this scheme, there is no division of rationalities, no reason that the
human be pulled in different directions—everyone is a calculating actor placed in a consistent and
determinate field (Posner 1983; Friedman 1953). The social field is determined by an economic logic
that modulates human actions on a pre-designed format. Even criminals and the mad are expected
to, at least as far as the state’s role (which here is primarily one of social control) is concerned, act
rationally, weighing the punishments or rewards they stand to gain (Becker 1974, 1993; Stigler 1974;
Pasquino 1991; Wacquant 2001). For economic theory to be applied, “rational action” does not have
to be defined in an exhaustive manner, but can be empirically measured as conduct that “reacts to
reality in a non-random way” (Foucault 2008a, pp. 267, 287; Becker 1962, p. 167). This neo-liberalism,
as Bourdieu (1998) put it, is a “strong discourse” of the order of the institutional psychiatric discourse
Goffman found in mental asylums. It is an “immense political project” that tends to sever “the
economy from social realities and thereby constructing, in reality, an economic system conforming
to its description in pure theory, that is a sort of logical machine that presents itself as a chain of
constraints regulating economic agents.”
American neo-liberalism reasons that the state pull back as an autonomous principle of any
kind, and allow the market to define the terms of the social field assuming, and thereby promoting,
economically rational action from social participants. Importantly, it proposes itself as an expression of
a social reality already there. As Lemke (2001) notes, neo-liberalism proposes itself as a project “that
endeavors to create a social reality that it suggests already exists” (p. 203). Market rationality is thus
assumed to be already a fact of social interactions.5 The project then is one of winning it the discursive
and de facto status being denied by the emphasis on the state as an autonomous analytical category

4
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For a representation of the Chicago school’s political and jurisprudential articulations, see Friedman (1953), Posner (1983)
and Becker (1974).
Lemke notes, “The theoretical strength of the concept of governmentality is that it construes neo-liberalism as a political
project that endeavors to create a social reality that it suggests already exists” (Lemke 2001, p. 203).

Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 84

9 of 16

in classical liberal discourse, and on “people” in critical discourses. The neo-liberals insist that the
market is itself the foundation of the state. What then becomes of “race”?
4. The Racial Condition of Neo-Liberalism
If liberalism with its multiple political, economic, and moral epicenters, negotiating the
doublespeak of equality and discrimination, communitarian goals and individual wealth, social
empowerment and colonial genocides, and weathering the uncertainties of early global capitalism
was forced to conjure new camouflage techniques thereby inventing and re-inventing “race,”
neo-liberal assurance needs none of that. Racism is here marked by the failure to follow economic
rationality, as defined by the neo-liberal normative paradigm. Claiming global industrial development,
the ideological gestures of race and gender equality, freedom of the colonies, and social welfare
as moments of its own history, subsumed in its content—even if it arises precisely as a reaction to
them—the new liberalism brooks no moral challenge. The neo-liberal state now authorizes itself to lay
terms for the future: “We did what we could, now you—the wretched—are responsible for yourself.”
Neo-liberal ideology conceives of the state primarily from a control perspective.
In the liberal phase of modernity, race featured as a political factor in the economic cause and
domain, and the state was the medium creating race as a factor of production and colonial accumulation.
In the neo-liberal design, where economic rationality enjoys an unhindered hegemony over social
relations, such rationality itself becomes the foremost determinant of race. Race, as essentialized
symptomatic segregation of the other, is, henceforth first an economic category; an economic category
that also works to authorize or legitimate the ascendancy of economic rationality (Becker 1974).
The exercise is seemingly all empirical, and governed by risk assessment (Becker 1993; Ewold 1991).6
The poor or the criminal, that is, economically unproductive, is, hereafter, likely to be colored; alternately,
because he is colored or unproductive, he is deservedly poor or, in prison. The cleverly disguised
double play evident in these correlates, where two (or more) factors reciprocally describe and authorize
each other—the statistical logic of correlation—is immensely important to the expediency of an
empiricist social policy (see also Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva 2008).
In early modernity, race, as a means of formal exclusion, was dominantly justified in terms of
the “otherness” of the other. The “other” race was constructed as the savage or barbaric that did not
belong to the civilized body social, and therefore could be treated as brute or animal, used as property,
or sacrificed—in Mississippi of the 1930s: “to kill a Negro wasn’t nothing. It was like killing a chicken
or killing a snake” (Litwack 1998, p. 284). Possibly, she could be trained to be human, howsoever
unworthy. In the neo-liberal ethic, the other is constituted as unproductive, as not belonging to the
body economic. While existing racial markers (say, defined by color) surely continue to factor, race
gets increasingly associated with a normative economic deficiency—an unwillingness to work and
properly reap the fruits of labor as becoming one’s human capital. The present, which usually presents
itself morally and temporally as laying ground for a better future, thus bases and legitimizes itself on
the social matter of the past, the traces, while representing and recognizing its newness as the very
negation (or denial) of the past.
Although the calculating rational actor is the foundation of neo-liberal discourse, a pragmatic social
practice nevertheless cannot shirk off a temporal dimension—rationality (as with the Ordo-liberals) is
both a principle and a project. At least idealistically, the discourse simultaneously assumes the subject as
rational, and presents its practices as a social pedagogical project of rationalization (see e.g., Becker 1993).
As with the discourse of sociology, where the collective is a more reliable and valid representation of
the individual, systemic rationality and individual rationality are one and the same.7 The cost and risk

6
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Crime, for example, is “any action that makes the individual run the risk of being condemned to a penalty” (Foucault 2008a, p. 251).
It uses rational choice theory at the micro level to derive implications at the group or macro level for informing social policy.
“Rational individual choice is combined with assumptions about technologies and other determinants of opportunities,
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of punishment will outweigh the possible gains from crime, and thus—going by a logic of marginal
utility—promote dispositions that are differentially more profitable both for the individual and the
system. The society thus is gradually programmed—simultaneously at the level of the collective and
the individual, morally and discursively as much as practically—into the economic model.
Importantly, however, for American neo-liberal social policy, such apparent trajectory of economic
programming is not a positive discourse, it is the negative discourse of punishment (see also
Wacquant 2001). Unlike the Ordo-liberal discourse, where the state acted as a positive agent implanting
an economic rationality into society (while also wanting to keep the moral fiber intact), neo-liberal
policy expects an economic rationality and capacity already there, failing which it jumps in to punish.
Resting the full weight on the individual—the one true American legend—it truly criminalizes the
individual for her inability to pull herself up with her bootstraps amidst the immense competitiveness
of a global late modern economy with record unemployment rates, and sputtering from crisis to
crisis. Furthermore, this consciousness has no autonomous conception of culture, or what the
phenomenologists may have called “lifeworld;” any collective or cultural expression, which cannot be
fathomed in economic terms as capital is, by definition, a nullity and nuisance, which only represents
a lack. Any public expression of sociality and cultural existence outside the normative institutional
lexicon is thus marked as a nuisance, which sooner or later invites penal action (Foucault 2008a;
Wacquant 2001).
Racial discourse here no longer posits a deep difference, which would be required to mark
the subjects of excessive exploitation. In a late modern, consumption driven economy relying on
computerized, high-end technology, the scarcity of labor is no longer the primary issue. Indeed,
what is more important is the ability to dispose of people with low human capital, who are only a
cost to the economy and have little to add to it, whether as producers or consumers. The idea of
“human capital” as both a productive and consuming entity provides a perfect merger here of an
economic rationale of privilege, a moral rationale of merit, and an economy increasingly dependent on
production and consumption of high-end goods, services, and technology (Foucault 2008a, pp. 226, 236;
Becker 1974, p. 134). Racism thus more or less purely excludes, instead of facilitating exploitative
inclusion or appropriation (cf. Young 1999).
If racial marking was more efficacious through the discourse of a collective essence earlier, race is
now marked in a slippery and circular discourse of biological capability, culture of indolence, and moral
irresponsibility. Culture here is “treated as more or less fixed, inherited just as inexorably as it had been
implanted in the genes” (Steinberg 2001). Precisely the discourse of essential equality mobilized to
oppose the previous racism is thus turned around into a rhetorical demand for par performance from
actors in an economic field. Race is then articulated from self-evident, statistically (scientifically, so to
say) obtained facts on individuals (see e.g., Kaufman 2016). Like the absolute science of mathematics,
statistical data apparently tells the empirical truth in the hic et nunc, beyond the can of worms opened
by historical and theoretical arguments (Friedman 1953; Becker 1993). Statistics tells the truth in the
obviousness and facticity of the surface.8
If, as I have argued, economic rationality—characterized circularly by systemic and behavioral
logic—is the primary marker of race today, does then “race” not become coterminous with “class”?

8

equilibrium in market and nonmarket situations, and laws, norms, and traditions to obtain results concerning the behavior
of groups” (Becker 1993, p. 403).
Such appeal of the surface logic conforms to a general profusion of surfaces characteristic of our “postmodern” times. Much
as for Simmel (1950) metropolitan individual, who is forced to condense social interactions into the bare dimension of
monetary exchange because of the surfeit of stimuli, the contemporary consciousness has no patience for depth information.
Submerged in the relentless flow of information, images, material, discourses, and forces, at once remote and instant
and expertly coded to tantalize and manipulate, it prefers promiscuity, a playing with ideas, images, and fragments,
and only has patience for surfaces, to taste and move on to the next. No metanarrative can satisfy its skeptical edge. This
cognitive orientation, usually with “pleasure” as its standard measure, agrees with a culture predominantly defined by
consumption. Knowledge here has to demonstrate its value through its utility for, and performance in the midst of, liberal
institutional logics.
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The issue deserves subtle discrimination, without succumbing to often hasty charges of so called
economic determinism. If racialization is a historical component of the internal contradictions of the
liberal discourse, its nexus with colonial capitalism, we do arrive at a materialist interpretation of
race—whether we understand it as a tactic of proletarianization of labor in the colony (Cox 1948) or
to provide for unfree relations of production, “under relations of direct politico-legal compulsion”
(Miles 1993, p. 50; Goldberg 1993). However, as I have argued here with Foucault, race acts as a
bio-political fracture of the population that allows “special methods” of administration and control
in the colony, while also serving similar ends on this side of the national boundary. This becomes
clear in race’s neoliberal denouement. Race has, if we must borrow from the sociological rationality of
domination itself, a functional role. Functionalism, as we know, is a discourse that puts a premium
on social stability. It is precisely stability that race provides, as much in neo-liberal conditions as it
did for classical liberalism. Race continues as a ground for discrimination, suffering, and poverty
deserved; race—in which the wretched among have always been a symptom, a reflection, a threat of the
wretched other. Racial marking makes character (personal or group) the reason for suffering, injustice,
and oppression in an otherwise just social and economic order. The more smoothly and covertly
the neo-liberal order can racialize social outcomes, the more effectively it functions to maintain class
privileges and distinctions, and suppress resentment (Goldberg 2011; Young 1999).
If it was on issues of morality that the liberal operationalization of race could not but tie
itself in knots—like Hobbes’ ridiculous derogation of the slave’s will, or Locke’s reconciliation
of slavery and man’s “inalienable rights,” or indeed the discourses of Kant and Voltaire that are
so focused on moral freedom, albeit its signs are based in physical appearance (see Eze 1997;
Foucault 2008b; Bernasconi and Mann 2005)—it is precisely in morality that neo-liberalism finds its
best ally. In addition, if the moral valence of the Enlightenment origins of liberalism was equal
rights and status before the law, in neo-liberalism it operates more and more as a behavioral
ethic—the lack of “an individualized disposition conceptualized as civility” (Goldberg 2011, p. 37).
As capital normatively defines not just work and social status but the mode of being itself, as much
in working as in consuming, as much in terms economic as cultural, disposition becomes the best
marker of race. Morality then centers about the appropriateness of disposition; race marks the
lack of appropriate disposition—those “already suspect, exhibiting habits, behavioral dispositions,
and cultural expressions deemed peculiar” (p. 135). Characterized as much by the working as
the consuming disposition, moral irreproachability expresses itself aesthetically. The lesser race is
marked by dubious behavior, poor consumption, and poor presentation of the self. In a late modern,
consumption driven economy, racial separation is marked by a moral criterion that cannot but be
merged with economic and aesthetic evaluations.
Does being black or being a person of color, or for that matter being white, matter in the
contemporary United States? The question should be asked at two different levels—one associational,
the other, structural. In the first case, racial and ethnic categories, such as black or white or Asian or
Indian or Latino, insofar as they are social facts cannot but define perceptions of others. Much
like any other social identity, like being blonde or college-educated or hetero-normative, such
identifications can enable inclusion in certain social groups and exclusion from others. Insofar as
white, heterosexual men dominate social, economic, and political institutions—both individually
and systemically (Feagin 2006)—people who share their identities are certainly likely to experience
more positive social outcomes. It is this level of differential social outcomes that statistical as well as
conventional theoretical exercises in sociology usually articulate.
The structural role of race, however, lies precisely in integrating the social body over and above
these distinctions. It is to provide a principle of inclusion and exclusion that is shared across these
divides; to a large extent, it is shared even by those that most suffer from it. Racism provides the
collective with a shared stigmatized other (disorderly, disagreeable, beastly, poor) from which one
must distinguish oneself through identifying with positive traits of being refined, educated, morally
upright—in sum, having “human capital.” Irrespective of their color, individuals and groups strive to
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distinguish themselves, as far as they can, from the wretched other. The function of the racially marked
wretched other is similar to that of the untouchable in India’s caste society. Absolute stigmatization as
signified by the term “un-touchable”, is the over-determined effect of a superimposition of sensory
repugnance supported by an ethical system, situated in economic conditions, and enforced by political
power (See Deliege 1992; Valmiki 2003). The effect is to separate and render invisible. Now, caste is an
elaborate system of division of labor, which despite its identification with strict hierarchies in Western
representations, provides a good amount of perks and predictability to many constituents. The radical
violence of the caste structure is, however, targeted against the un-touchable—the outcaste whom it
severs, calumniates, and forces into absolute submission (see Khare 1984; Valmiki 2003). Likewise,
the radical violence of the racist structure of the contemporary United States expresses itself in the
confinement, humiliation, and complete subjection of a minority—the African American or Latino
male—whom a combination of poverty, color, and the gendered structure of the neoliberal economy
combine to forcefully exclude (Wacquant 2000, 2001).
Race here is thus the referent of an overarching collective disposition—neo-liberalism,
simultaneously an economic doctrine, a political strategy, and a moral decision. The economic fetish
it is predicated on, may be a positive goal, but this particular elaboration of social goals is made
socially feasible, and driven by a necessity of social control.9 It is perhaps no coincidence that this
discourse gets unequivocally articulated, and accepted, in the United States, a society deeply divided
by race. Above that, in the South Side of Chicago, within the haloed corridors of an elite university
no sooner inaugurated than it found itself subject to “negro invasion,” and their “vicious resorts,”
unwittingly sinking in a neighborhood that became home to waves of black, formerly slave migrants
from the South (Bachin 2004, p. 58). In his 1992 Nobel lecture, Gary Becker, perhaps the most radical
of the Chicago Neo-liberals, describes how his disgust for laws expanding rights of criminals in the
1950s and 1960s drove him to extend economic theory into non-economic fields: “These changes
reduced the apprehension and conviction of criminals and provided less protection to the law-abiding
population” (Becker 1993, p. 390). With the nonchalance that is so characteristic of this stream of
thinking, Becker gives an anecdote recounting the risk he once took of illegally parking on a street
by Columbia University, by calculating the amount of penalty and odds. The risk paid off, he did
not get a ticket; Becker then describes how this influenced his work on extending the lessons of
economics to the social sphere, particularly on criminal behavior. This contributed to the epoch of the
war against drugs, zero tolerance, and so on, a systemic criminalization of poverty and race, without
being explicitly racial (Wacquant 2000; Alexander 2012). For the Nobel-prize winning policy expert,
the stakes involved but a parking ticket, but for the hundreds of thousands incriminated by racialized
behavior, life time in prison and the punitive, “no second chance” gaze of the establishment is the
reality (see Bledsoe and Sow 2011).
5. In Conclusion: No Neo-Liberalism without Race
In several European countries, perhaps a cultural belonging and density, bildung, so well-illustrated
by Gadamer (1975), has historically grounded an alternate conception of meaning and identity—a
“warm” domain –as a collective counterpoint to the pull of accumulation and material interests. (Albeit
it must be noted that given the hegemony of American style neoliberalism for several decades, this
may be rapidly vanishing) (See e.g., Cafruny and Ryner 2003). In the United States, to the contrary,
the racial schism lies deep in the national consciousness (Gerstle 2001); the economic fetish is impelled
by a compulsion to reject others whose identity can now only be marked by lack of wealth and
social status—poor/immoral/criminal—and the deficiency in economic rationality (that is, an ethic
and etiquette of work and consumption) ascribed as its reason and condition. As a total discourse,
neo-liberalism thus provides both principles of behavior, and a practical policy of social control of
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On the powers of horror and disgust see Kristeva (1982).
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human beings it has by definition essentially deciphered (see Bourdieu 1998; Becker 1974). It dangles
the lure of fantastic wealth and pride on one side, and complete subjection to the penal might of an
absolute state on the other. The neo-liberal social dictum for the human subject is clear: “Work, be
seen working . . . ”. The elliptical threat is simultaneously unequivocal, infinite in its consequences,
and coded in its message.
In this article, I have argued that racialization is the condition for the social production and
viability of American type neo-liberal discourse as a guideline for social policy. The absolute social
engineering it posits, and the complete wedges it eventually draws in society, re-articulate only the
divides it already assumes are present. In the lack of a substantive motif of bildung, a shared belonging,
and in fact driven by a legacy of deep racial division, this difference can only make a moral virtue
of wealth accumulation and consumption, and effective enforcement of discipline. Thus, I would
argue that racism defines the extent to which neo-liberal social policy of the Chicago variety is publicly
professed and practiced in a society. The relative hegemony of neo-liberalism can perhaps be taken as
an indicator of the extent to which the racial divide determines social policy. Therefore, if European
countries did not pioneer a Chicago-school type of extreme discourse, it is because state policy was
not motivated by the aggressive, retributive impulse that marks the United States’ history of internal
racism (see e.g., Feagin 2006; Alexander 2012). Even in the UK, which has coupled with US economic
and foreign policy doctrines for long periods, and despite major ethnic conflicts, neo-liberal social
policies provoked far more resistance than they did in the United States (see e.g., Harvey 2005).10
At the same time, however, to the extent neo-liberalism arrives–and it has indeed arrived emphatically
across the world today—it will develop racial divides, as much in terms of divides in social outcomes
as discoursive forms (see Lentin and Titley 2011; Pred 2000).
The primary inference of this Foucauldian reading is that a critical understanding of racialization
necessarily requires a critical engagement with neo-liberalism as an economic, political, and moral
discourse. Racialization is but the stratification of groups by social and behavioral characteristics
over-determined by a strong discourse, which must be simultaneously political, economic, moral,
and cultural. If both state policy and progressive activism find it easier to mobilize on apparent “color”
lines today, the battle lines may shift in the future and lead into new alignments, group formations,
and concomitant discursive shifts. Yet, as long as the neoliberal discourse is hegemonic, it cannot do
without an effect of exclusion, which can be systematically elaborated, and is capable of simultaneously
mobilizing a collective morality and disgust. Thus, not much will be achieved by questioning “race,”
without questioning the very axioms of the liberal discourse that spawns it and the neo-liberalism that
insidiously perpetuates it today. Racial lines will continue to be (re)excavated, borrowed, or inscribed
afresh to channel, reinforce, and institutionalize the social violence that neo-liberalism must unleash.
This violence is poised to be as physical and systemic as it will be moral and symbolic.
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